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1. On 26 February 2014, the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, UK requested permission to 
intervene in Georgia v. Russia (II). On 6 March 2014, the President of the Court granted leave, 
under Rule 44 para. 3 of the Rules of Court.  
2. The intervention addresses the scope of extra-territorial applicability of the Convention and the 
relationship between the law of armed conflict (LOAC), also known as international humanitarian 
law, and human rights law. It does not deal with the facts of the present case. Nor does it address 
the recognition by Russia of Abkahzia and South Ossetia, save insofar as it may affect the scope of 
the issues under examination in this brief. The brief refers to the intervention of the Human Rights 
Centre in Hassan v. UK, 29750/09, which also addressed the relationship between the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law in the context of an international armed conflict. For 
convenience, excerpts from the earlier intervention are attached as an appendix to this document. 
3. The question of extra-territorial applicability of the Convention must be examined separately from 
the relationship between human rights law and LOAC, as the two matters are capable of arising 
independently of each other. Extra-territorial applicability of the Convention will remain a crucial 
issue for actions taken outside of an armed conflict in the territory of another state.1 Conversely, 
the relationship between the two bodies of law will arise in the context of non-international armed 
conflicts in which there is no crossing of borders. Accordingly, this brief proceeds with a general 
examination of extra-territorial applicability of the Convention, before moving to the question of 
its relationship with LOAC.  
THE SCOPE OF EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY OF THE CONVENTION 
4. It is important to distinguish between the fact of the exercise of jurisdiction outside national 
territory and the scope of the jurisdiction exercised. Just because a State exercises jurisdiction over 
X (e.g. the decision to open fire) does not mean that it has jurisdiction over Y (e.g. the right to 
education). Conversely, just because a State does not have plenary jurisdiction does not mean that 
it has none.2 
5. Whether or not the State had lawful grounds to act in the foreign territory is virtually immaterial to 
applicability of human rights obligations regarding its actions. If prior jurisdictional authority to act 
on the territory of another state were a prerequisite for the applicability of human rights 
obligations, this would provide a license to abuse rights with no repercussions for those States 
acting without authority. The deciding matter for the applicability of obligations is the factual 
exercise of jurisdiction, whether lawful or not.3   
                                                             
1 For example in cases of detention of drug-traffickers on the high-seas. Rigopoulos v. Spain (dec.), Application No. 
37388/97, Decision of 12 January 1999;  Medvedyev and others v. France, (Application No. 3394/03, ) Grand 
Chamber, Judgment of 29 March 2010. 
2 Ilascu & others v. Moldova & Russia, (Appllcation No. 48787/99), Grand Chamber, Judgment of 8 July 2001;  Al Skeini 
& others v. UK, (Application No. 55721/07), Grand Chamber,  7 July 2011 
3 Issa v. Turkey, (Application No. 31821/96, Judgment of 16 November 2004, para.71. "… a State may also be held 
accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State 
but who are found to be under the former State's authority and control through its agents operating - whether 
lawfully or unlawfully - in the latter State" emphasis added. 
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6. States, in ratifying the Convention, undertake to secure to persons “within their jurisdiction” the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Convention.4 Generally speaking, a State exercises 
its jurisdiction within its own territory.5 There are a range of situations, however, in which a State 
exercises its jurisdiction outside national territory.6  
7. From the significant number of cases arising outside the national territory of the respondent State 
which the Court has had to address, it is clear that the key concept in determining whether an act 
or omission is within the jurisdiction of the respondent State is the question of control. Control is 
evidenced in a range of ways.  
8. The first is physical control over the applicant. An obvious example is extra-territorial detention.7 
Detention can occur in any place; it does not have to take place in a recognised place of 
detention.8 The second is control over the act or omission said to constitute a violation of the 
applicant’s rights as a result of the State’s control over its agents. An example is the decision of 
armed forces to open fire against an individual.9 In both the first and second examples, the State 
exercises a direct control over events. It should be remembered that where there is physical 
control over the applicant, that control is exercised by state agents. In other words, extra-
territorial detention comes within both types of control. The third example of control is where the 
State exercises direct control in a particular area, usually through the presence of its security 
forces.10 The area does not need to be large and the control does not need to be of long duration. 
What matters is the exercise of control at the time of the event said to constitute the violation. 
The fourth example is general control over territory. This occurs during occupation11. It can also 
arise where the control is exercised through a subordinate administration.12 In either case, the 
State, by virtue of the total control which it exercises, has analogous responsibilities to those 
within its national territory. The final example arises where a State exercises a decisive influence 
over the local government, even if it is not technically a subordinate administration.13 It is possible 
that the State exercises a decisive influence in some spheres (e.g. public security) and not others 
(e.g. regulation of private law relations). That possible limitation in the scope of the decisive 
influence exercised does not arise in the case of occupation or control through a subordinate 
administration. The first three examples have in common that the control is directly exercised by 
                                                             
4 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Art.1. 
5 Georgia v. Russia (II), (Application No. 38263/08), Admissibility Decision of 13 December 2011, para. 66 and sources 
cited therein. 
6 For a discussion of the range of situations in which the Convention may apply outside national territory, see Al 
Skeini, note 2, supra, paras. 130-150. 
7 Al-Skeini, note 2, supra; Hess v. United Kingdom (1975) 2 D&R 72. 
8 Ocalan v. Turkey, (Application No. 46221/99), Judgment of 12 May 2005; see also the case of the 5th applicant in Al 
Skeini, note 2 supra. 
9 Al Skeini, note 2 supra, 4th applicant; see also Isaak v. Turkey, Application No.44587/98, judgment of 24 June 2008. 
10 Issa, note 3 supra. 
11 Loizidou v. Turkey, (Application No. 15318/89, Grand Chamber, judgment of 18 December 1996; Cyprus v. Turkey, 
Application No. 25781/94, Grand Chamber, judgment of 10 May 2001. 
12 “Where the fact of such domination [i.e. through a subordinate administration] over the territory is established, it 
is not necessary to determine whether the Contracting State exercises detailed control over the policies and actions 
of the subordinate local administration. The fact that the local administration survives as a result of the Contracting 
State’s military and other support entails that State’s responsibility for its policies and actions. The controlling State 
has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the area under its control, the entire range of substantive 
rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified.” Catan & others v. Moldova & 
Russia, (Application No.43370/04, 8252/05 & 18454/06), Grand Chamber, judgment of 19 October 2012, para. 106. 
13 Ilascu & others, note 2, para. 392. 
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state agents, who determine the course of events. In the fourth and fifth examples, the State 
exercises control through its control over legislation and policies of the government and its control 
over the administration, including the police and the judiciary. This is in addition to the control it 
exercises over its armed forces. In other words, the range of issues within its control is much 
broader in the case of the fourth and fifth examples than in the case of the first three. 
9. The different range of issues within the control of the State in the different examples affects the 
scope of the State’s human rights obligations. For example, in the case of extra-territorial 
detention, the detaining State has – at a minimum – obligations under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the 
Convention, since it controls the physical environment in which the person is detained and the 
regime applicable to the detention. The State is less likely to be exercising the type of control 
necessary to be responsible for the education or rehabilitation of detainees, unless it is also in 
occupation of the territory. Or again, where the State is operating a roadblock, in territory over 
which it is in the process of establishing control but has not as yet done so, the State’s 
geographical control may be limited to the area in the immediate vicinity of the roadblock but it 
does control the circumstances in which its armed forces open fire.14 As far as a person 
approaching the roadblock is concerned, the State is in a position to control whether or not its 
forces open fire but not to determine respect for the individual’s freedom of expression or 
assembly. Its control over the circumstances in which the armed forces open fire also means that 
the State has the control necessary to conduct an investigation into that decision.15  
10. For those rights found to be applicable, the context of the particular situation can affect the level 
of the obligation and the criteria against which the State’s actions must be examined. For example, 
the scope of the obligation to investigate may well be more limited than in a similar situation in 
national territory, particularly if the State does not exercise control over a sufficiently wide area as 
to enable it to travel around freely in order to have access to witnesses. This could even be true in 
a military occupation when the whole spectrum of human rights obligations will apply.16 In other 
words, the contextual approach will affect not only the question of which human rights obligations 
are applicable (which may be fairly narrow in situations of limited control over an individual), but 
also the level of obligation and actions required by the State to fulfil its obligations.  
11. The focus so far has been on the obligation to respect and protect the rights of the applicant 
where the alleged perpetrator is an agent of the State. In certain circumstances, even in the first 
three types of control, the State may have an obligation to protect an individual from the acts of 
third parties. This can only arise where the State exercises the necessary control over a situation. 
An example of this type of situation would be where a group of people is being beaten up by a 
local militia in a situation in which the armed forces of the State are present  in sufficient number 
to be considered as having control of the immediate environment. In such circumstances, the State 
forces cannot stand by and watch the beating take place without intervening.   
12. In certain circumstances, the State may be directly responsible for the acts of non-State agents. If 
the State exercises “effective control” over the acts of an organised armed group, those acts will 
                                                             
14 Al Skeini, note 9 supra. 
15 Al Skeini, note 2 supra, paras. 161-167. 
16 Ibid, para.168; see note 76 infra and accompanying text. 
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be attributable to the State, under general principles of state responsibility.17 This is independent 
of the question of control exercised through a subordinate administration. 
13. The foregoing suggests that, in order to determine whether alleged violations were within the 
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, the Court needs to ask itself a number of questions. 1. What 
was the nature of the control, if any, exercised by Russia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia prior to the 
armed conflict? In particular, was it in occupation or did it exercise a decisive influence over the 
local authorities? 2. Did the nature of the control exercised by Russia in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia change upon the outbreak of hostilities? Did it exercise “effective control” over the local 
militia? 3. In “Georgia proper” was the nature of the control exercised during the armed conflict 
confined to the first three types of control discussed above? 4. After the end of the active 
hostilities, what was the nature of the control exercised by Russia in areas outside South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia (i.e. the buffer zones)? 5. After the end of the active hostilities, what was the nature 
of the control exercised by Russia within South Ossetia and Abkhazia? In particular, what was the 
nature of its relationship with the local authorities in control of those areas?18  
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOAC AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (HRsL) 
Preliminary issues 
14. A number of preliminary issues need to be addressed, before examining the principles regulating 
the relationship between LOAC and HRsL. First, the rules on the resort to armed force (ius ad 
bellum) are irrelevant to the analysis of LOAC. Whether the State is acting in self-defence or not, it 
is required to obey the same rules in the conduct of the hostilities and the protection of victims.19  
15. Second, LOAC distinguishes between international and non-international armed conflicts. If the 
LOAC rules are of any relevance, it is necessary to classify the conflict(s). It is possible for more 
than one conflict to be occurring at the same time. An international armed conflict is a conflict 
between two States.20 There appears to be no minimum threshold to the violence required to 
constitute an armed conflict, at least where it involves the armed forces of the two States.21 The 
conflict between Georgia and Russia was therefore an international armed conflict. The conflicts 
between Georgia and the militia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are more difficult to classify. At first 
sight, they were non-international armed conflicts, since they were between a State and what 
were prima facie two organised armed groups. According to the Tadic case, a non-international 
                                                             
17  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. USA), I.C.J. judgment 
of 27 June 1986, paras. 115-6. 
18  Recognition of a local administration does not prevent the recognising State from in fact exercising control through 
its own forces and/or a subordinate administration e.g. Loizidou v. Turkey, note 11 supra. 
19 Adam Roberts, “The Principle of Equal Application of the Laws of War” in Rodin & Shue (Ed.s), Just and Unjust 
Warriors, OUP, 2008. 
20 Geneva Conventions of 1949, common Article 2; Additional Protocol I of 1977, Article 1. 
21 “Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an 
armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It 
makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. The respect due to the human 
person as such is not measured by the number of victims.” ICRC Commentary on the Four Geneva Conventions of 
1949, pp. 20–21. 
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armed conflict exists where there is “protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”22  
16. Where the acts of an organised armed group are, in fact, attributable to a State, the conflict will be 
international. The test which is to be applied to determine whether the relationship between an 
organised armed group and a State is such as to make the conflict international is unclear. In the 
Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice addressed the issue of attribution under the law 
of state responsibility, rather than the classification of an armed conflict.23 It held that the test was 
whether the State exercised “effective control”. The provision of weapons, finance or training was 
not sufficient. What was required was control over the operations of the group.24 In the Tadic 
Case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was dealing with the 
classification of conflicts. It determined that the appropriate test was “overall control”.25 The ICJ 
confirmed its own test in Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 Feb. 
2007.26 This potentially gives rise to a major difficulty. If a conflict is international because an 
organised armed group is under the “overall control” of a State, this means that the rules 
applicable to international armed conflicts apply to the acts of the group. If, however, the group is 
not under the “effective control” of the State, its acts are not attributable to that State. The group 
presumably remains responsible for its own acts. But the rules applicable in international armed 
conflicts, at least under treaty law, apply to States and to organised militia belonging to States. In 
other words, it is not clear how such an organised armed group can be bound by the treaty rules 
applicable to international conflicts. It would, therefore, be prudent to apply the same control test 
for classification and attribution. Whether this should be the “overall” or the “effective” test 
remains a subject of debate.27 
17. If Russia exercised control over the acts of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz militia, the conflicts 
were all international. If Russia did not exercise control over the acts of the two militia, the 
Georgia/Russia conflict was international but the Georgia/two militia conflicts were non-
                                                             
22 Tadić case, ICTY, No. IT-94-1-AR72, § 70. 
23 Note 17 supra. 
24 “The Court has taken the view (paragraph 110 above) that United States participation, even if preponderant or de-
cisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or par-
amilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the evi-
dence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the 
contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States participa-
tion mentioned above, and even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a high degree of de-
pendency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced 
the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State.” Ibid, 
para.115. 
25 Cassese, who was the President of the Appeal Court in Tadic, has pointed out that whilst the ICTY was indeed 
classifying the conflict, it based its analysis on the rules of attribution under the law of state responsibility, since no 
guidance was afforded by international humanitarian law;  “The  Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the 
ICJ Judgment  on Genocide in Bosnia”, Eur J. Int. Law (2007)  18(4) 649-668, 
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/4/649.full 
26 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) , I.C.J., judgment of 26 Feb. 2007 
27 Cassese, note 25 supra. It should be noted that, where the acts of a group are not attributable to a State, the State 
may still bear responsibility for failing to prevent the act from being committed in those cases where the State has an 
obligation to prevent the commission of such wrongs.  
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international. It is possible that the relationship between Russia and the two militia was different 
(i.e that Russia exercised control over one but not the other). 
18. Whatever the general relationship between Russia and the militia throughout the conflict, it is 
possible that the latter was under the control of Russian forces in a particular incident. This means 
that, in order to determine the LOAC rules potentially relevant, the Court has to examine each 
incident, to see which forces were involved. 
19. Third, it is necessary to consider the source of alleged LOAC rules. Georgia and Russia are both 
parties to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977. In 
addition, Russia has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding 
Commission, under Article 90 of Protocol I.28 Georgia and Russia are both parties to the 1980 
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention and all its Protocols. The regulation of international 
armed conflicts is largely treaty based, in the sense both that the treaty regime is fairly 
comprehensive and also that the treaties in question are widely ratified (and have been ratified by 
both parties to the current case). That is not true of the treaty rules applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977 
apply principally to the protection of victims.29 There are very few rules on the conduct of 
hostilities. Having said that, Article 13 of Additional Protocol II prohibits attacks on civilians and 
Article 17 prohibits the forced movement of civilians. Nevertheless, there is nothing like the detail 
contained in Additional Protocol I. Since the mid-1990s, many rules of customary international law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts have been revealed, notably through Henckaerts 
and Doswald-Beck (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law30 and the decisions of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Many of those decisions were 
subsequently endorsed by States in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.31 Whilst 
generally the identification of rules is not controversial, there is disagreement regarding the scope 
of some rules in the accompanying commentary and some controversy about the application of 
the methodology.32 
20. The judicial pronouncements regarding the relationship between LOAC and HRsL do not 
distinguish between international and non-international armed conflicts or between rules of treaty 
law and rules of customary law. It would appear that all LOAC rules are to be treated in the same 
way. 
21. Finally, it must be remembered that not everything that occurs during an armed conflict is 
regulated by the law of armed conflict. If an individual, during the course of an armed conflict, 
burgles his neighbour’s home in an act not directly related to the conflict (other than taking 
advantage of reduced policing in the vicinity), the actions of individual and State in relation to this 
                                                             
28 http://www.icrc.org/ihl; States party to the main treaties. 
29 Certain actions prohibited under LOAC are identified but there is very little on those things that are permitted 
during armed conflict which would be prohibited under “normal” HRsL. 
30 Volume 1: Rules, ICRC & CUP (2005) 
31 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8.2.e deals with violations of the laws and customs of war 
applicable in NIACs, other than violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The list is based 
on what is thought to be both prohibited and criminalised under customary law. 
32 Letter from John Bellinger III,Legal Adviser, US Dept of State, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel, US Dept of 
Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Intl  Comm of the Red Cross, Regarding Customary 
International Law Study, 46 ILM 514 (2007);  
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event are regulated by domestic criminal law and human rights law. In order to be regulated by 
LOAC, the act or omission should have a clear nexus to the conflict. 
 
When LOAC may be relevant to the decision of a human rights court 
22. In the third party intervention in Hassan v. UK,33 the present interveners set out, first, what the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has said about the relationship between the two bodies of 
rules34 and, second, how the view of the ICJ is to be operationalised. It was emphasised that the 
applicability of LOAC is not a reason for a human rights Court not to exercise jurisdiction. Rather, 
LOAC may need to be taken into account by the body when determining if there is a violation. It 
was suggested that situations form a spectrum.35 At one end, there will only be a violation of 
human rights law (HRsL) if there is a violation of LOAC. At the other end, the only law applicable 
will be HRsL, but the situation of conflict may be relevant as part of the background. In the middle, 
the two bodies of rules may both be relevant. In summary, it is more likely that incidents involving 
the rules on the conduct of hostilities between the belligerents, including rules on weapon use, will 
be at one end of the spectrum, at least in the case of incidents of high intensity. Situations 
involving the rules on the protection of victims, particularly where they arise away from the 
immediate scene of hostilities, are more likely to involve a mixture of LOAC and HRsL. This 
approach means that there can be no general rule mandating the same balance of LOAC and HRsL 
in each case. Rather, each type of situation has to be examined in turn. 
23. It should be noted that, in practice, there is less likely to be a conflict between LOAC and HRsL at 
the lower end of the spectrum. The LOAC rules on the protection of victims tend to prohibit similar 
behaviour to that prohibited under HRsL. Where most difficulty is likely to arise is where LOAC 
permits behaviour prohibited under HRsL. One example is targeting based on status (i.e. on 
membership of a group, rather than on the behaviour of the individual targeted). Another is use of 
weapons normally prohibited in the context of law enforcement. It should be noted, however, that 
in some circumstances, LOAC prohibits the use of a weapon in an armed conflict that is permitted 
in law enforcement. An example is the prohibition of the use of “dum-dum” or expanding bullets in 
international armed conflicts.36 
24. The Hassan intervention also addressed the question of the relationship between derogation, 
including the absence of derogation, and the relevance of LOAC.37 That will not be further 
addressed here. 
                                                             
33 Application No. 29750/09; the most relevant parts of that document are set out in an Appendix to this intervention. 
34 Appendix, paras. 14-18. 
35 Ibid, paras. 26-30. 
36 Expanding bullets may be a useful tool of law enforcement. They permit the targeting of an individual whilst 
minimising the risk that those in the vicinity will be harmed by the bullet passing through the person targeted and 
also hitting others. It is therefore useful in hostage situations. The reason for its general prohibition under LOAC is 
that it gives rise to injuries that are very difficult to treat. In other words, it gives rise to superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering, since the person hit could have been rendered hors de combat in medically less damaging 
ways. At the Kampala Review Conference of the ICC, an amendment was adopted which will prohibit the use of 
expanding bullets in NIACs. The implications for Special Forces, who often have to act in hostage type situations, are 
unclear.  
37 Appendix, paras. 20-21. 
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25. The issues of killings and injuries, ill-treatment, damage to and destruction of property, detention, 
forced movement, access to education, investigations and the right to a remedy will be examined 
in turn. There will also be an examination of the situation at the end of active hostilities. 
 
Killings & injuries 
26. There will only be a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the case of 
deaths and injuries resulting from acts of violence between the armed forces of two States where 
there has been a violation of the relevant rules of LOAC. That means that individuals can be 
targeted where they are members of the opposing State armed forces, irrespective of whether 
they pose any threat at the time, or if they are taking a direct part in hostilities at the time they are 
targeted.38  
27. It should be noted that LOAC not only prohibits attacks against civilians but also requires that, in 
targeting combatants or military objectives, the State take account of the risk to civilians and 
civilian property. The foreseeable harm to civilians and civilian objects must not be excessive in 
relation to the military advantage anticipated.39 This represents a completely different concept of 
proportionality to that used in HRsL.40 Furthermore, in carrying out an attack, a State is required to 
take precautions in attack with a view to minimising (sic) civilian casualties.41 A State can use any 
weapon on condition, first, that its use is not prohibited by LOAC and, second, subject to the 
restrictions imposed on the use of certain weapons, notably as a result of the Protocols to the 
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention.42 The general rules on proportionality and precautions 
in attack have implications for the choice of weapons, in addition to the specific rules relating to 
weapon use. 
28. In the case of a major clash between a State and an organised armed group (OAG) during a non-
international armed conflict, there will only be a violation of the ECHR where there has been a 
violation of the relevant rules of LOAC. By necessary implication, under treaty law, the parties may 
attack a person who is directly participating in hostilities at the time.43 There is no such thing as 
combatant status for members of armed groups in NIACs. The practical difficulties to which the 
direct participation test gives rise led the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to 
convene a series of meetings with experts meeting in their personal capacity. This resulted in the 
production of interpretive guidance which has proved highly controversial for a variety of 
                                                             
38 Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 43, 48 & 51. Protection from attack is provided for those who are hors de 
combat, Article 41. 
39 Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. They include “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in rela-
tion to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”; ibid, Article 51.5.b. 
40 Lubell, “Challenges to applying human rights law to armed conflict”, IRRC, (2005) Vol.87, No. 860, p.737. 
41 Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of 
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects”; Additional Protocol I of 1977,  Article 57.2.(a)(ii).  
42 The principal Protocols to the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention regulate the use of anti-personnel mines, 
incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons, cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war. 
43 There is no combatant status in NIACs. Civilians are protected from attack “unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities”; Additional Protocol II of 1977, Article 13.3 
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reasons.44 The report clarifies what activities constitute direct participation and the time window 
in which a person is regarded as directly participating. Those elements are relatively 
uncontroversial. The report treats members of an OAG as, in one sense, the equivalent of a State’s 
armed forces.45 It states that a person who is a member of an OAG and who exercises a continuous 
combat function may be targeted, irrespective of the threat he poses at the time.46 It is hard to see 
how continuous combat function is to be evidenced other than by direct participation in hostilities 
(i.e. behaviour, rather than status). The response of States suggests that they think they may target 
a member of an OAG, without the need to establish that he performs a continuous combat 
function.47 There is probably a similar requirement as to proportionality and precautions in attack 
under customary international humanitarian law as in the case of IACs but the express treaty rules 
refer to neither. 48 Generally speaking, weapons prohibited in IACs are prohibited in NIACs.49 The 
Protocols of the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention apply to both types of conflict as a 
result of a treaty amendment.50 
29.  In the case of deaths and injuries inflicted away from an area of active hostilities, HRsL will carry 
greater weight, although aspects of LOAC can remain relevant.51 The reliance on a HRsL approach 
increases wherever there is a decrease in the factors that signify an act between parties to an 
armed conflict. This includes a combination of the proximity to active hostilities, the individual 
status determination as a combatant or behaviour that leads to loss of protection, the weapons 
used on both sides, and the amount of control over the situation and possible alternatives to 
action.  
30. In the case of the death, injury or ill-treatment of a person under the control of opposing forces, 
the issue can be dealt with under HRsL. LOAC equally prohibits the ill-treatment of such persons.52 
There will, however, be a need to take into account the background of conflict in assessing the 
matters such as the handling of an investigation.53 
                                                             
44 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities in International Humanitarian 
Law, ICRC, 2009. For criticisms, see Issue 42.3 of the New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
(2010) and US Naval War College, International Law Studies, Vol.87, Pedrozo & Wollschlaeger (Ed.s), International 
Law and the Changing Character of War, (2011). 
45 “In non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to 
the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continu-
ous combat function”)”; Melzer, note 44 supra, p.27. They are not the true equivalent of a State’s armed forces be-
cause, whilst they can themselves be targeted, they do not have a right to participate in hostilities or to target the 
armed forces. 
46 Ibid, p.36. It must, however, also be noted that the ICRC Guidance speaks of the need to consider alternatives when 
using force against legitimate targets  “where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force”.  This 
section was subject to particular debate. Note 44 supra. 
47 E.g.  Authorities cited in Note 44, supra. 
48 Note 30 supra, Rule 14 proportionality and Rules 15-21 precautions in attack. 
49 Tadic, note 22 supra, para.119; “What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but 
be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife.”  
50 See also Convention prohibiting Certain Conventional Weapons, amended Article 1, 2001. 
51 For example, a missile strike in an international armed conflict against the military command of an opposing party 
in a building far from the actual battlefield, will in most circumstances be an acceptable act under LOAC and should 
not be considered a violation of HRsL. 
52 A possible exception is the use of force to prevent the escape of a prisoner of war, which is the subject of express 
regulation; Geneva Convention III, Article 42. 
53 Notes 75 & 76 infra. 
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Damage to or destruction of property 
31. There will only be a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of damage 
to or destruction of property resulting from acts of violence between the armed forces of two 
States where there has been a violation of the relevant rules of LOAC. Those rules permit the 
targeting of military objectives.54 Civilian objects, defined as all objects which are not military 
objectives, cannot be targeted. There is a presumption that buildings normally used for civilian 
purposes, such as homes and schools, are being so used.55 Specific provisions apply to cultural 
property, including places of worship, and to things such as foodstuffs on which civilians depend 
for their survival.56 Civilian property benefits from the protection of the principle of proportionality 
and the requirement of precautions in attack, but can equally fall within the LOAC rules 
recognising what is often the inevitability of limited collateral damage.57  
32. There is no express definition of military objectives or general protection of civilian property in 
NIACs.58 There are provisions on specific types of property. It appears that the position under 
customary international law is broadly similar to that in IACs. 
33. In the case of damage or destruction of property inflicted away from an area of active hostilities, 
HRsL will carry greater weight and can be used to regulate State action, whilst taking account of 
the context of conflict. This would be the case, for example, if a party to the conflict attacked a 
village where there were only civilians and destroyed their homes.59 Such actions would be equally 
in violation of LOAC prohibitions on a range of activities in relation to property, such as looting, 
pillage and wanton destruction.60 
Detention 
34. It is necessary to distinguish between different elements in a detention regime.61 There may only 
be a violation of the ECHR where there is a violation of relevant LOAC provisions in the case of 
certain elements but others may require a mixing of LOAC and HRsL. In the case of detention 
                                                             
54 Additional Protocol I of 1977, Article 52.2. 
55 Ibid, Article 52.1 (definition of civilian objects) and 52.3 (presumption). 
56 Ibid, Articles 53 (cultural property) and 54 (objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population); see also 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 1954 and the Second Protocol to that Convention 1999, 
extending its applicability to NIACs. Georgia and Russia are both parties to the 1954 Convention. Georgia became a 
party to the Second Protocol on 13 September 2010. Russia is not a party to that Protocol. 
57 In order for damage to or destruction of civilian property to be unlawful, it must 1. have been deliberately targeted, 
or 2. have been foreseeably excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated or 3. have been inflicted in 
violation of the rules on precautions in attack. There are special rules about the taking, damage or destruction of 
property in occupied territories; Hague Convention IV of 1907 on War on Land, Regulations, Articles 46, 47, 52, 53, 55 
& 56. Further, the seizure or destruction of enemy property is unlawful generally (i.e. not just in occupied territory) 
unless “imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”; ibid, Article 23 g. 
58 The reason for the lack of a definition of what can be lawfully targeted in NIACs is similar to the reason for the lack 
of combatant status. States do not wish to grant members of an organised armed group a lawful right to target 
certain people or certain things. Instead, they define what is unlawful, whilst remaining silent about the lawfulness or 
otherwise of other acts. The only provisions in Additional Protocol II of 1977 relating to property are Articles 14-16. 
59 E.g. Selcuk & Asker v. Turkey, (Application No. 23184/94), Judgment of 24 April 1998; Ayder & others v. Turkey, 
(Application No. 23656/94, Judgment of 8 January 2004. It should be noted that Turkey denied that the situation in 
eastern Turkey came within common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. 
60 Pillage – Hague Convention IV of 1907 on War on Land, Regulations, Article 28; Geneva Convention IV of 1949, 
Article 33; wanton destruction – Hague Convention supra Regulations, Article 23 g. 
61 Third party intervention in Hassan, Appendix, paras.29-30. 
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effected during the course of an IAC, the grounds of detention are determined by LOAC, together 
with the general system (not necessarily the detail) of review of detention and the circumstances 
in which detention must end. On that basis, members of the opposing armed forces can be 
detained as prisoners of war.62 Civilians can only be detained on imperative grounds of security, 
whether in occupied territory or not.63 Their detention has to be reviewed by a board at six 
monthly intervals.64 The details of their treatment and their rights in the review process are 
regulated by a mixture of LOAC and HRsL. 
35. The position in NIACs is less clear. It may be necessary to distinguish between NIACs in national 
territory and those outside national territory.65 Treaty law does not expressly provide for a power 
to detain but assumes that detention occurs and regulates certain aspects of it. Customary 
international law appears to provide a power to detain.66 It would indeed be strange if 
international law allowed certain people to be killed (those taking a direct part in hostilities) but 
did not allow them to be detained. The ground of detention in a NIAC is presumably that the 
detainee represents a serious security threat to the armed forces and/or the civilian population. 
Other elements of the detention regime are regulated by a mixture of LOAC and HRsL. The nature 
of the ground of detention is likely to have implications for the general system of review of 
detention, particularly in the case of NIACs outside national territory.67 
Forced movement 
36. In IACs and NIACs, LOAC may regulate the grounds on which civilians are moved. Other aspects of 
their treatment during such a movement will be based on a mixture of LOAC and HRsL. On that 
basis, civilians can only be moved for their own safety or imperative reasons of security.68 This 
clearly implies that such forced movement can only be short term, whilst the need for it exists. 
Civilians cannot be deported out of their own territory into that of an occupying power or any 
other State. 
Access to education  
37. LOAC does not address access to education during active hostilities. Clearly the application of HRsL 
in this field needs to take account of the existence of an armed conflict. In occupied territory, the 
                                                             
62 Geneva Convention III of 1949, Article 21. 
63 Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Articles 41, 42 & 78. 
64 Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Article 78. 
65 Generally speaking, NIACs occur in national territory, but they can also occur in extraterritorial situations. For 
example, where one or more States are assisting the territorial State in its armed conflict with an OAG, the assisting 
States are involved in a NIAC because the opposing party is a non-State actor e.g. Afghanistan after the installation of 
Hamid Karzai. The national legislation of the assisting States (e.g. authorising internment in an emergency) is unlikely 
to apply outside national territory. Nevertheless, the assisting States need the power to detain those who present a 
real security threat to the armed forces and the civilian population. 
66 Pejic J., ‘Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other 
situations of violence’ (2005) 87 (858) International Review of the Red Cross 375, 377; Gill & Fleck, The Handbook of 
the International Law of Military Operations, OUP (2010). 
67 E.g. if detention is based on the threat posed by the detainee but where the evidence cannot be used as the basis 
for criminal prosecution before a court. 
68 In IACs, Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Article 49 (occupied territory); in NIACs, Additional Protocol II of 1977, 
Article 17.  
13 
 
occupying power has additional specific LOAC obligations to ensure the functioning of educational 
institutions.69  
 
After the end of active hostilities 
38. Generally, LOAC ceases to apply at the end of active hostilities but there are provisions designed to 
secure the protection of individuals even after this time.70 Whilst, in the period immediately after 
the close of active hostilities, it may be necessary to recognise LOAC grounds of detention, that 
period will not last long. 
39. Where the close of hostilities also represents the start of occupation, a specific LOAC regime 
applies. Given the control over the territory which an occupier has to be able to exercise, it is 
appropriate for the occupying power to have the full range of HRsL obligations.71  
 
Investigation of alleged violations  
40. Although LOAC can require investigations in certain circumstances, there may be perceived 
differences between LOAC and HRsL in this regard. For example, while under LOAC there is a need 
for investigation if there appears to have been a violation which amounts to a war crime,72 civilian 
deaths which appear to be lawful under LOAC (e.g. circumstances whereby it was indisputably 
within the proportionality formula) might fall outside this obligation.73 There is also a question as 
to the type of investigation (if any) required for violations of LOAC that do not amount to war 
crimes.74 HRsL, however, could arguably require an investigation for most civilian deaths,75 and 
thus of incidents which might fall outside those requiring an investigation under LOAC. In practice, 
                                                             
69 Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Article 50. 
70 Geneva Convention I of 1949, Article 5; II, Article 6; III, Article 5; IV, Article 6; Additional Protocol I of 1977, Article 3 
(modifying Geneva Convention IV, Article 6). 
71 Loizidou v. Turkey, (Application No. 15318/89, Grand Chamber, judgment of 18 December 1996; Cyprus v. Turkey, 
Application No. 25781/94, Grand Chamber, judgment of 10 May 2001. The scope of each particular obligation raises a 
different issue; see note 76 infra. 
72 This is most clearly the case with regard to the Grave Breaches regime, but also goes beyond this and stems, for 
example, from the duties to ensure respect and supress violations, and from customary international law; see 
analysis of customary international law in ICRC study, note 30 supra, pp.607-610; for examinations of the duty to 
investigate and a number of possible approaches to its implementation, see: A. Cohen and Y. Shany ‘Beyond the 
Grave Breaches Regime: The Duty to Investigate Alleged Violations of International Law Governing Armed Conflicts’, 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 14 (2011), pp 37-84; M. Schmitt, ‘Investigating Violations of 
International Law in Armed Conflict’ Harvard National Security Journal, Vol.2.1 31-84 (2011); The Public Commission 
To Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (Turkel Commission), Second Report: Israel’s Mechanisms for 
Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to 
International Law.  
73 “The incidental death or injury of a civilian during an armed conflict, conversely, does not necessarily give rise to an 
automatic suspicion of criminality; it will be the context in which the incidental death or injury occurred that will 
determine whether there is a reasonable suspicion of the perpetration of a war crime. Any such reasonable suspicion 
will immediately trigger an investigation.” Turkel Commission, ibid, p.102. 
74 The Turkel Commission was of the opinion that war crimes require an investigation, while other violations require 
“some form of examination”, ibid, p.99. 
75  Isayeva, Yusupova And Bazayeva v. Russia (Applications Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 And 57949/00), Judgment, 24 
February 2005, para.208; “The Court has held that the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to apply in 
difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict” Al-Skeini v UK, note 2 supra, para.163-4. 
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cases that come before human rights bodies are likely to be of the type that would have required 
investigation also under LOAC, due to circumstances pointing to alleged breaches of LOAC and not 
only HRsL. Finally, the precise shape of investigations conducted in the context of armed conflict 
cannot always reasonably be expected to meet the same standards as peace time domestic police 
investigations.76 Many aspects of an investigation, from collection of forensic evidence to using 
experts at the alleged scene of crime might be difficult – if not impossible – to fulfil on the 
battlefield, and the specificities of the obligation must be interpreted in context.77  
 
The right to an effective remedy 
41.  The relevance of LOAC to the right to an effective remedy only arises where the violation of HRsL 
depends upon a violation of LOAC. Otherwise, the question of the right to remedy would appear to 
be solely regulated by HRsL. Where there has been a violation of the State’s LOAC obligations, 
LOAC does not appear to make express provision for individual redress but it does not prohibit it. 
Furthermore, there is significant evidence that, at the time of the drafting of Hague Convention IV 
of 1907 on War on Land and its annexed regulations, it was assumed that Article 3 of the 
Convention provided for an individual right of reparation.78 Where HRsL provides for a right to a 
remedy in the case of a violation of HRsL, it would be perverse for such a right not to apply to 
violations of both LOAC and HRsL.   
 
  
                                                             
76 “The Court takes as its starting point the practical problems caused to the investigatory authorities by the fact that 
the United Kingdom was an Occupying Power in a foreign and hostile region in the immediate aftermath of invasion 
and war. These practical problems included the breakdown in the civil infrastructure, leading inter alia to shortages of 
local pathologists and facilities for autopsies; the scope for linguistic and cultural misunderstandings between the 
occupiers and the local population; and the danger inherent in any activity in Iraq at that time. As stated above, the 
Court considers that in circumstances such as these the procedural duty under Article 2 must be applied realistically, 
to take account of specific problems faced by investigators.” Al-Skeini v UK, note 2 supra, para.168.   
77 Ibid.  
78 Kalshoven F., “State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of Armed Forces: From Article 3 of Hague Convention IV to 
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Beyond”, 40 ICLQ (1991) 827-858. It should be noted that the Basic 
principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of IHRsL and serious 
violations of IHL (van Boven/Bassiouni), GA Res. 60/147, 16 December 2005 refer equally to violations of HRsL and 
LOAC. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, in Article 75, provides for the possibility of reparations payable 




HASSAN v. UNITED KINGDOM, 29750/09 
INTERVENTION SUBMITTED BY PROF. FRANCOISE HAMPSON & PROF. NOAM LUBELL 
OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX 
Excerpts: 
ii. What the ICJ has said and done about the relationship and the inferences to be drawn 
14 The ICJ has addressed the relationship on three occasions, in two Advisory Opinions and one 
contentious case. In the first case, the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, the Court stated, 
“The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby 
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.”1 It went on to say, 
“In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The 
test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the 
applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a 
certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 
6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and 
not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.”2 
15. The second Advisory Opinion concerned the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall. 
The Court stated, “As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, there are thus three possible situations:  some rights may be exclusively 
matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights 
law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.  In order to answer 
the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian 
law.”3 
16. In the contentious case, DRC v. Uganda, the Court repeated its statement in the second 
Advisory Opinion but it did not include in the quotation the last sentence.4 It then went on to 
find Uganda responsible for violations of LOAC/IHL and human rights law both in Ituri, which 
it considered to have been occupied, and in areas of the DRC which Ugandan forces did not 
occupy. The findings involved unlawful killings. The Court did not explain whether it only 
found a violation of Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the killings 
were in violation of the applicable rules of LOAC/IHL or whether the two findings were 
independent of one another. The ICJ does not face the problem confronting human rights 
bodies. It is free to find violations of both LOAC/IHL and human rights law. A human rights 
body, on the other hand, only has the competence to find a violation of human rights law. It is 
therefore essential that it knows in what circumstances it can only find a violation of human 
rights law if there is a violation of LOAC/IHL. 
17. Certain elements do emerge clearly from the statements of the ICJ. First, the applicability of 
LOAC/IHL does not displace the jurisdiction of a human rights body. That results from the 
                                                             
1 ICJ, Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 25  
2 Ibid 
3 The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 
July 2004, para. 106; 
4 ICJ, Case concerning armed activity on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment of 19 December 2005, paras. 216–220 at para.216. 
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finding that human rights law remains applicable in all circumstances. Second, where 
LOAC/IHL is applicable, a human rights body has two choices. It must either apply human 
rights law through the lens of LOAC/IHL or it must blend LOAC/IHL together. That is the only 
possible interpretation of certain matters being the province of both bodies of rules, whilst 
others are regulated by LOAC/IHL. 
18. The reference to lex specialis is unhelpful, which may account for why the ICJ did not include 
the final sentence in its quotation from para.106 of the Advisory Opinion in the subsequent 
contentious case. Whilst in general terms its meaning is clear, its specific meaning and 
application appears to be interpreted in a different way by every commentator. Use of this term 
has served to obfuscate the debate rather than provide clarification. It was designed to deal with 
a different situation – a vertical relationship between a general regime and specific regimes.5 
The relationship between LOAC/IHL and human rights law involves a different problem – the 
horizontal collision of two separate legal regimes. One is not a more specific form of the other. 
That being said, it seems that according to the ICJ, in some circumstances, there will only be a 
violation of human rights law if there is a violation of LOAC/IHL. That is not, however, the 
only manifestation of the relationship. There are other circumstances in which the ICJ regards it 
as necessary to apply a mixture of LOAC/IHL and human rights law. The question then 
becomes in which circumstances should a human rights body apply which approach? 
19. There are two issues which the ICJ did not expressly address. The first is whether the reference 
to LOAC/IHL includes reference to customary humanitarian law. The Court did address that 
indirectly. In DRC v. Uganda, it included amongst relevant texts Hague Convention IV of 1907, 
on the basis that its provisions represent customary law.6 The issue will not be further addressed 
here, since it is not relevant in this case.7  
20. Second, what is the relationship between derogation and the taking into account of LOAC/IHL 
by a human rights body? There would appear to be four possible permutations. First, if the State 
invokes LOAC/IHL where it is not applicable, and whether or not the State has also derogated, 
the human rights body should refuse to apply LOAC/IHL owing to its non-applicability. 
Second, if the basis for using LOAC/IHL at all is that human rights bodies should take account 
of other relevant areas of international law, that might be thought to point to its use whether or 
not a State has derogated and whether or not the State has invoked LOAC/IHL. On the other 
hand, where the State has done neither, the human rights body may wish to refer to the 
applicability of LOAC/IHL, whilst saying that the State has chosen to be judged by a higher 
standard (i.e. peacetime human rights law). The danger is that the result runs the risk of 
appearing disconnected from reality.8 Third, where the State has not derogated but has relied on 
LOAC/IHL, the human rights body has two choices. It can either take account of LOAC/IHL, 
on the basis that it is an independently applicable body of rules, or it can argue that the only way 
of modifying human rights law is by derogating. In other words, it could argue that the 
‘gateway’ to taking account of LOAC/IHL is derogation and not merely the applicability of 
LOAC/IHL. In that case, the human rights body would presumably also need to find that a State 
both can and should derogate when involved in armed conflicts outside national territory. 
                                                             
5 Hampson, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law from the perspective of a 
human rights treaty body”, IRRC, (2008) Vol.90, No.871, p.549 at pp.558-562; see generally, Prud’homme, ‘Lex spe-
cialis: oversimplifying a more complex and multifaceted relationship?’ Israel Law Review, Vol.40 (2) (2007), pp.355–
95 
6 Note 20, para. 217. 
7 The issue is likely to be most relevant to cases involving the conduct of hostilities and extra-territorial detention in 
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).  
8 Note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
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Finally, where a State has derogated but has not invoked LOAC/IHL, the human rights body 
could either refer to the applicability of LOAC/IHL but say that the State has chosen to be 
judged by a higher standard or else it could take account of LOAC/IHL as an independently 
applicable relevant body of rules. It is important that a human rights body should not, by words 
or omission, appear to suggest that LOAC/IHL is not applicable when it is in fact applicable. 
21. Finding a coherent way through all these permutations has become much more difficult in the 
past twenty years. Until the mid 1990s, there appeared to be no rules on the conduct of 
hostilities in NIACs. Since then, through the work of the International Criminal Tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the drafting of the Rome Statute, it appears that there 
are many such customary rules. That has a potentially very significant impact on a human rights 
body.9 Since the question of the relationship between derogation and the use of LOAC/IHL 
appears to be a question of principle, it is not open to a human rights body to choose one 
solution for IACs and another for NIACs, unless it can do so on the basis of principle.  
22. Apparently conflicting guidance on the issue is provided by the ICJ. On the one hand, human 
rights law remains applicable in all circumstances, subject only to derogation. This appears to 
point to the necessity of derogation. On the other hand, in some circumstances LOAC/IHL is the 
guiding law. It is possible to reconcile, somewhat artificially, the two approaches by limiting the 
former to human rights law itself and understanding the second as not modifying human rights 
law itself but rather as explaining how it is to be applied in certain circumstances.10 No other 
guidance is available.  
23. Even absent derogation, the factual existence of armed conflict (as opposed to the application of 
LOAC/IHL) may affect human rights obligations. A distinction should be drawn between the 
very applicability of human rights law and the scope of the obligations imposed.11 The 
circumstances at hand may affect the manner or extent to which the State can fulfil, or fail to 
fulfil, its obligations. The factual circumstances in which the State finds itself are already taken 
into account by the Court, even without a derogation.12 
iii. criteria to apply to determine the interplay between the two regimes  
                                                             
9 It might, for example, permit a shift from a law and order paradigm to an armed conflict paradigm, which permits 
targeting on the basis of status or membership of a group, at a relatively low level of disruption. The general view is 
that common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, which applies in NIACs, was applicable at least at certain 
times and places in Northern Ireland and that it was applicable to the situation in eastern Turkey in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Both governments denied the applicability of Common Article 3. Common Article 3 does not address the 
conduct of hostilities. If the recently discovered customary rules apply at the common Article 3 threshold, established 
case-law would have to be called into question in future cases. See generally, Melzer, Interpretive guidance on the no-
tion of direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law, ICRC, 2009; Hampson, ‘Direct participa-
tion in hostilities and the interoperability of the law of armed conflict and human rights law’, in International Law 
Studies, Vol.87, US Naval War College, 2011, pp.187-213. It would also radically change the meaning of proportional-
ity; see Lubell, “Challenges to applying human rights law to armed conflict”, IRRC, (2005) Vol.87, No. 860, p.737 at 
pp. 744-746. 
10 It could be that derogation would be of relevance in NIACs as part of the evidence establishing the applicability of 
LOAC/IHL. 
11 Lubell ‘Human Rights during Military Occupation' (2012) 885 IRRC 317 
12 Ilascu & others v. Moldova & the Russian Federation, note 16; Isayeva & others v. Russian Federation, 57947-9/00, 
Judgment of 24 February 2005; Finogenov v. Russian Federation, 18299/03 and 27311/03, Judgment of 20 December 
2011; Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, note 1, para. 168; The need to take factual circumstances into 
account is not limited to armed conflict. Detention on the high seas, or privacy of correspondence in a prison, are 
examples in which the obligations might be interpreted differently in light of the circumstances. See Human Rights 
Committee, Miguel Angel Estrella v. Uruguay, Communication No.74/1980, UN Doc.CCPR/C/OP/2 at 93 (1990), 
para.9.2; ECtHR, Rigopoulos v. Spain, Application No.37388/97, Decision of 12 January 1999; see also ECtHR, 
Medvedyev and Others v. France, note1, paras. 127–134.   
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26. The first question to be addressed is the identification of those issues where there will only be a 
violation of human rights law if there is a violation of LOAC/IHL. There is no general, top-
down principle which can be applied to establish if an issue should be handled one way or an-
other.13 The answer will vary not only in relation to the issue involved but also in relation to 
other variables. Issues involving the protection of victims are more likely to involve a blend of 
LOAC/IHL and human rights law. Issues involving the conduct of hostilities are more likely to 
require a human rights body only to find a violation of human rights law if there is a violation of 
LOAC/IHL. Even that general proposition is subject to at least five variables. First, is the situa-
tion an IAC or a NIAC? The degree of intensity of a NIAC may also be relevant.14  Second, it 
may be relevant to consider whether any military operation is proactive or reactive.15  Third, it 
may be necessary to consider the means used to conduct the operation, bearing in mind that too 
much reliance on this element may reduce the level of scrutiny applied.16  Fourth, it may be nec-
essary to consider whether there is an existing provision of LOAC/IHL and, if so, whether it is 
customary or treaty based.17  Fifth, it may be relevant to know whether the State has derogated 
and/or acknowledged the applicability of LOAC/IHL.18 Putting these elements together will 
produce a spectrum. At one end will be issues where, in the circumstances, there will only be a 
breach of human rights law if there is a breach of LOAC/IHL. At the other end, a human rights 
body will be required to blend LOAC/IHL and human rights law. Some issues will be generally 
at one end of the spectrum but, on occasion, a different solution will be required. This spectrum 
approach appears to offer the best chance of providing flexibility for a human rights body, 
whilst providing sufficient guidance for the armed forces. An example of an activity where it is 
likely that in most circumstances there will only be a violation of human rights law if there is a 
violation of LOAC/IHL is the conduct of a military operation involving the armed forces of two 
opposing States and sophisticated weaponry. 
                                                             
13 For example, proximity to the battlefield might point to applying human rights law through the prism of LOAC/IHL 
but where does that leave the drone operator based thousands of miles from the point of impact? Similarly, it might be 
thought that rules on the conduct of hostilities would point the same way but that rules on the protection of victims 
would point to reliance on human rights law. That would, however, suggest that the specificities of the POW detention 
regime would be diluted, even though it has evolved over centuries, responds to the exigencies of the specific situation 
faced in IACs and is contained in a treaty which has received universal ratification. Similar objections can be raised 
with the regard to the blanket application of any individual criterion. 
14 Under LOAC/IHL treaty rules, there are only rules on the conduct of hostilities in a NIAC at a high level of intensity 
(Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 entered into force 7 December 1978 and not 
merely Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions). 
15 This is a relevant distinction in human rights law; McCann & others v. United Kingdom, 18984/91, judgment of 
Grand Chamber of 27th September 1995; Ergi v. Turkey, 23818/94, judgment of 28th July 1998. 
16 If the use of air strikes were thought to indicate the need to apply human rights law through the prism of LOAC/IHL, 
there would be a temptation for States to resort to such strikes, as opposed to ground operations, to achieve that result. 
17 It is sometimes suggested that LOAC/IHL should be the law applied where it contains a specific provision. Whilst it 
may be an element to include in the mix, to place exclusive or even primary reliance on this element would lead to 
arbitrary results. It would also require a definition of “specific provision”. Does the fact that there are detailed 
detention regimes in IACs mean that it is “specific”, leaving no room for the use of human rights law, or does the 
absence of specific provision about access to information and access to legal representation mean that there is no 
specific provision? The problem identified here arises where an activity is regulated under LOAC/IHL provision but 
they do not address specific details regarded as routine under human rights law. There is a separate problem where 
LOAC/IHL does not address a particular issue at all. Examples include the manner and circumstances in which a 
search is conducted, the policing of demonstrations and controls on the operation of the media, for example to protect 
national security or to prevent the incitement of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Here, there is no 
overall context of LOAC/IHL regulation. There may be a temptation to suggest that nothing should displace the normal 
operation of human rights law. It is submitted that the better approach is set out above at para.23. 
18 See discussion at para.20. 
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27. The second question arises where it is determined that the norms applicable involve a mixture of 
LOAC/IHL and human rights law. In this situation, the answer requires the application of both 
bodies of rules. That still leaves the question of how great a departure from "normal" human 
rights law will be permitted. Any given situation is likely to require elements of both bodies of 
law working together, but the balance and interplay will vary. The elements referred to in the 
previous paragraph will be relevant. The interplay between the regimes must be context depend-
ant, and must lead to practicable obligations based on a respect for the objectives of the two re-
gimes in light of the circumstances at hand. A number of criteria can provide guidance, but no 
single criterion is independently determinant. The criteria that can affect the interplay will in-
clude (but are not limited to): 
 The status of affected individuals: for example, circumstances involving detention of POWs 
lend themselves more to LOAC/IHL than to the rules of human rights law; 
 The proximity to hostilities and the level of control that the military has over the situation: 
LOAC/IHL will dominate in a typical battlefield scenario, whereas human rights law will 
play a greater role when dealing with situations that do not involve hostilities and in which 
there is greater control (and therefore a range of riskless options), such as demonstrations 
which become violent; 
 The means used in the operation: for example, use of the air force will indicate that 
LOAC/IHL is likely to provide regulation of force. Notwithstanding, this must not become 
an incentive to utilise heavy weaponry unnecessarily in order to rely on LOAC/IHL.19  It 
should be recalled that LOAC/IHL will not be applicable if the situation has not reached the 
threshold of armed conflict.  
 As noted earlier, whether or not the state concerned has relied upon LOAC/IHL, and 
whether or not it has derogated, may also affect the legal analysis of the interplay. 
28. Specific situations cannot be reduced to one applicable rule, and any set of circumstances will 
require a number of rules to be utilised. In other words, a specific LOAC/IHL provision can 
only relate to one single aspect of a situation but does not provide a solution for the legal regula-
tion of the circumstances as a whole.  Moreover, the reliance on the notion of “specific” does 
not provide an answer in the case of absence of a rule: does the absence of a specific 
LOAC/IHL provisions mean that LOAC/IHL specifically says that these are not required, or 
would it mean that human rights law is required to fill the gap?20  Situations of detention, for 
example, can trigger the examination of grounds of detention, review, treatment, fair trial (if a 
criminal charge is laid), and more. It may be the case that some of these matters will need to be 
determined primarily by LOAC/IHL and others by human rights law. Any given situation is 
likely to require elements of both bodies of law working together, but the balance and interplay 
will vary. 
29. Accordingly there may be situations – such as detention of POWs – in which the combination of 
criteria lead to the conclusion that LOAC/IHL would carry more weight in the interplay, and 
determination of human rights violations regarding issues such as grounds and review of deten-
tion will be based on the relevant LOAC/IHL rules. Even in such contexts, however, human 
rights law would not be under absolute subjection to LOAC/IHL. For example, if there are alle-
gations of inhumane treatment, human rights law would still assist in determining issues such as 
the specificities of acts which constitute a violation. Conversely, in other contexts the combina-
tion of criteria will require heavier reliance on human rights law in the interplay. This may be 
                                                             
19 Supra, n.37; see generally Gulec v. Turkey, 21593/93, Judgment of 27 July 1998. 
20 Supra, n.38. 
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the case, for example, when attempting to detain a civilian who does not pose a direct threat at 
that precise moment, in an area under the complete control of the military and in which they can 
operate unhindered. In such circumstances, even if the individual may have lost civilian protec-
tion under LOAC/IHL due to rules on participation in hostilities, human rights law may require 
a graduated use of force rather than direct lethal force. LOAC/IHL will remain relevant, and can 
affect matters such as the composition of the detention review mechanism, while human rights 
law will feed in once more on certain safeguards. 
30. From the perspective of a human rights body, it would be advantageous to use human rights law 
as the first step to identify the issues which need to be addressed (e.g. periodicity of review of 
lawfulness of detention; access to information about reasons for detention; legal assistance be-
fore the review mechanism). The second step, determining applicable law in relation to the al-
leged violations, would then require a contextual analysis using both LOAC/IHL and human 
rights law, in light of the circumstances of the case at hand.  On condition that the human rights 
body presents its analysis with sufficient coherence and clarity, the decisions generated will pro-
vide guidance to States and armed forces ahead of future action. It goes without saying that the 
approaches and the result must be capable of being applied in practice in situations of armed 
conflict. 
 
